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THE VALIDITY OF VOTING TRUST PROVISIONS
IN RECENT RAILROAD REORGANIZATIONS.
A voting trust, in the present significance of the term, is a
device whereby the legal title to the stock of a corporation is
vested in trustees, while the equitable interest in such stock is
secured to the real owners and evidenced by certificates of bene-
ficial interest. Such certificates, in accordance with the'agree-
ments under which they are issued, secure to their holders ever)-
right incident to the ownership of -the stock, except the right
.to vote upon it, which right is reserved to the voting trustees.
The apparent purpose of such voting trust is to secure control
over, and direct the policy of, the corporation during a definite
or indefinite future period. The motives which lead to attempts
to effect this purpose are, of course, innumerable. The voting
trust, however, has been extensively used to further the plans
of the various syndicates which have undertaken recently to
reorganize the great railroad systems of this country and to
take them out of the hands of receivers. It so happens that
the reorganization plans proposed by these syndicates, several
of which have already been carried into effect, have adopted
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forms of a voting trust almost identical in nature. It is thus
in the case of the Northern Pacific System, the Union Pacific
System, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, the
St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company, and the Erie
System. As a matter of fact, the voting trust agreement
adopted or to be adopted in these cases has never been directly
passed upon by the courts, and questions respecting its va-
lidity are consequently of the greatest importance, involving,
as they do, financial interests of magnitude.
The voting trust adopted by the new Erie Railroad Company
is almost identical, as we have said, with that proposed in the re-
organization plans of the above railroad systems. It may there-
fore be stated as embodying their essential features. Accord-
ing to the reorganization agreement between a Reorganization
Committee of three men and all holders of stocks and bonds
of the old Erie Railroad Companies, it was provided that the
holders should deposit with certain designated depositaries
their securities, assigning them to the committee for the pur-
pose of carrying out the agreement. One of the terms of this
agreement was that the committee should procure the incor-
poration of a new Erie Railroad Company, should foreclose
certain mortgages and buy in at the sale the old Erie Com-
panies, and should then sell the property so acquired to the
newly incorporated company in return for securities to be
issued by such company. The holders of the securities in
the old company were then to receive from the committee
securities in the new company. Those who were entitled to
receive the stock of the new company were to receive in place
of the ordinary certificates, "certificates of beneficial interest,"
so-called, corresponding in all respects with ordinary stock
certificates except that they did not entitle the holder to vote.
This plan was carried into effect by an agreement between the
Reorganization Committee of three and three individuals named
by such committee to act as Voting Trustees. By such agree-
ment the committee delivered to the Voting Trustees all the
certificates which were acquired upon the incorporation of the
new Erie Company (reserving a sufficient number to qualify
directors), and the Voting Trustees agreed to issue to the
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committee stock trust certificates equal in amount to the
certificates of stock issued to them. The agreement further
provided:
."Second.-On the First day of December, I9oo, if the Erie
Railroad Company shall then have paid four per cent. cash
dividend, in one year, on its first preferred stock and, if not,
then so soon as such dividend shall be so paid, or whenever
prior to such date, or after such date and prior to such pay-
megut of dividend, the Voting Trustees shall decide to make
delivery, the Voting Trustees in exchange for, .and upon
surrender of, any stock trust certificate then outstanding will,
in accordance with the terms hereof, deliver proper certificates
of stock of the Erie Railroad Company,
1' Fifth.-Any Voting Trustee may, at any time, resign by
Ae livering to the other Voting Trustees, in writing, his resigna-
tion, to take effect ten days thereafter; and in every case of
death, or resignation, or of the inability of any Voting Trustee
to act, the vacancy so occurring shall be filled by the appoint-
ment of a successor or successors to be made by the other
Voting Trustees by a written instrument; and the term
"Voting Trustees" as herein used shall apply to the parties of
the second part and their successors hereun~der,
Sixth.-All questions arising between the Voting Trustees
shall from time to time be determined by the decision of the
grater number of those then acting as Voting Trustees either
at a meeting or by writing with or without meeting, and in
like manner they may establish their rules of action.
"Seventh.---In voting the stock held by them, the Voting
Trustees will exercise their best judgment from time to time
to select suitable directors, to the end that the affairs of the
company shall be properly managed and, in voting on other
matters which may come before them at an), stockholders'
meeting, will exercise like judgment; but they assume no
responsibility in respect to such management or in respect of
any action taken pursuant to their votes so cast, it being under-
stood that no Voting Trustee incurs an), responsibility by reason
of any error of law or an), matter or thing done or omitted under
this agreement, except for his own individual malfeasance."
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The form of the Erie common stock trust certificate is ap-
pended in a footnote.*
*ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY.
COMIMON STOCK TRUST CERTIFICATE.
This is to certify that, as hereinafter provided ..................................
will be entitled to receive a certificate or certificates for ...................
fully-paid shares of one hundred dollars each, in the common capital
stock of the Erie Railroad Company, and in the meantime to receive pay-
ments equal to the dividends, if any, collected by the undersigned Voting
Trustees upon a like number of such shares standing in their names;
and, until the actual delivery, of such certificates, the Voting Trustees
shall possess, and shall be entitled to exercise, all right of every name
and nature, including the right to vote, in respect of any and all such
stock, it being expressly stipulated that no voting right passes by or
under this certificate, or by or under any agreement, expressed or implied.
This certificate is issued under and pursuant and subject to the terms
and conditions of a certain agreement dated January I, 1896, by and
between C. H. Coster, Louis Fitzgerald and Anthony J. Thomas, as a
Committee, and the undersigned Voting Trustees.
No stock certificates shall be due or deliverable hereunder before the
first day of December, i9oo, nor until the expiration of such further period,
if any, as shall elapse before the Erie Railroad Company, in one year. shall
have paid four per cent. cash dividends on its first preferred stock; but the
Voting Trustees, in their discretion, may make earlier delivery.
This certificate is transferable only on the books of the undersigned
Voting Trustees by the registered holder, either in person or by attorney
duly authorized, according to rules established for that purpose by the
undersigned Voting Trustees and on surrender hereof; and until so trans-
ferred the undersigned Voting Trustees may treat the registered owner as
holder hereof for all purposes whatsoever, except that delivery of stock
certificates hereunder shall not be made without the surrender hereof.
This certificate is not valid unless duly signed by J. P. Morgan & Co.,
as agents, and also registered by the Iercantile Trust Company of New
York, as registrar.
In Witness Whereof, the undersigned Voting Trustees have caused
this certificate to be signed by J. P. Morgan & Co., their duly authorized





By their Agents hereunder,
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It is our purpose in this paper to discuss the validity of this
and similar voting trust agreements. In so doing, our con-
sideration will be confined to cases which are likely in the
future to arise involving the legality of the voting trust, and
will not extend to a discussion from an abstract standpoint of
the status of the voting trust. But before beginning the con-
sideration of the law relative to voting trusts in general and
the voting trust above set forth in particular, it is necessary to
make a preliminary distinction. The motives leading to the
creation of a voting trust are, of course, innumerable; and
undoubtedly they have had effect upon the minds of the judges
when applications for a preliminary injunction against the right
of trustees to vote have been made. At the same time, it is
apparent that, apart from questions respecting the validity of
the voting trust in itself, it will not be allowed to be the instru-
ment to carry into effect some unlawful purpose. That is to
say, if a voting trust is made the medium of carrying out an
illegal scheme, it will not be allowed to stand even if considered
lawful in itself. In Clark v. Central Railroad and Banking
Comianj of Georgia, 5o Fed. R. 338 (1892), stock in a railroad
company was purchased in the interest of a competing line and
was vested in another company as trustee. The law of the state
in which the railroad company was situated, forbade the con-
solidation of competing lines. It was therefore held that the
device of the voting trust designed to effect a union of compet-
ing lines was void, and the trustee was enjoined from voting
upon the stock. It is evident that cases of this nature are not
direct authority in determining the staltus of voting trusts in
and of themselves.
Possibly the best way of arriving at some understanding of
the development of the law upon this subject would be to take
up the cases one by one in the order of their decision. Before
doing this, however, we should try to gain some idea of the
practical reasons leading to the creation of these voting trusts.
We will then have our attention drawn to what is significant
in the decisions. Each one of these reorganization schemes
have followed upon the bankruptcy of the railroad company.
Consequently the value of the stock of the road has been in
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all the cases but a small fraction of its nominal or par value..
And upon the creation of the new company the stock issued
in exchange for the old does not represent in value its par.
Inasmuch as actual control of the corporation is vested in the
stockholders through their voting power, the various bond-
holders, who have submitted to a reduction in their income,
are naturally desirous of seeing the policy of the corporation
for the future secured in the hands of those in whom they have
confidence. They particularly do not desire that the control
of the roads should remain in the hands of a majority of the
stockholders, who comprise necessarily a fluctuating body,
even if there be no organized effort on the part of some
antagonistic interest to obtain control. The voting trust in such
a reorganization is therefore a condition inserted for the pui-
pose of securing mortgage bondholders by placing the control'
in the hainds of those whom they trust. In the particular case
of Erie, which is not at all exceptional, the provision that there
shall be no delivery of stock until the payment of 4 per cent.
on the first preferred stock, secures control to the Voting
Trustees so long as they shall care to use it. They elect the
directors; the directors need not declare a dividend until the
Voting Trustees so desire. In the hands of the three Voting
Trustees, who have the power to appoint successors, may be
prolonged the control over the the Erie System forever. They
may not have the slightest financial interest in the road nor be
representative of any party having a financial interest, yet the
control of three men over the Erie Railroad, if the voting trust
shall stand, is legally assured for all time, unless they see fit
to relinquish it. We turn now to the development of the law
as seen in the decisions.
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. Law, 222 (1834), is the first
case of interest to us upon this subject. It arose upon an
application 'to set aside an election for officers of a corporation.
One of the points in controversy was whether stockholders
might vote upon their stock by proxy. After an elaborate
argument, it was decided that at common law no right to vote
by proxy existed, and consequently that a corporation had no
power to create such a right by its by-laws. This statement
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of the common law upon the subject has never been questioned,
but the right to vote by proxy is now secured by provisions
in the general incorporation acts of the several states. The
idea underlying the decision in Taylor v. Giswold seems to
have been that the issuance of the charter to stockholders was
indicative of confidence bestowed in them by the state, and
that it was a violation of their duty and beyond their power to
delegate the execution of the trust reposed in them by the
grant of the franchise. And although this theory has been
gradually impaired, yet its effect certainly remains, and the
law recognizes a responsibility existing upon each stockholder
to use his vote in furtherance of the interest of the corporation,
and not solely for his individual interest, ignoring the rights of
his fellow- stockholders.
In Brown v. Pacific 11fail Steamslip Company, 5 Blatchf. 525
(I865), we meet with the first case in which an agreement in
the nature of a voting trust was called into question. Certain
stock was vested in Brown Brothers & Co., under an agreement-
to endure for four years. The parties to this agreement agreed
not to sell the stock without 6rst offering it to the remaining
parties, and an irrevocable power of attorney to vote the stock
was given to Brown Bros. & Co. Certain stockholders,
friendly to the interest represented by Brown Bros. & Co.,
filed a bill for an injunction against certain other stockholders
who contemplated applying in a state court for an injunction
restraining Brown Bros. & Co. from voting upon the stock
vested in their names, In support of this bill it was averred
and admitted by the answer that there was a scheme on the
part of the defendants looking toward the obtaining of such an
injunction from a subservient state judge, with the purpose of
enabling a minority to acquire control of the company. The
court refused to consider the trust agreement void in sc, and held
that, so long as there was no effort on the part of the beneficial
owners to withdraw from the trust, there was no reason why
Brown Bros. & Co. should not vote upon the stock in their
name. It is apparent, unless the voting trust is in se illegal
and void, that the decision was a correct one.
In Fishe-r v. Bush, 35 Hun. (N. Y.) 641 (1885), ten stock-
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holders in a corporation had agreed not to sell their stock
without the consent of all, stipulating that in case of such
sale a certain sum should be paid as liquidated damages.
Defendant sold, and the remaining stockholders sued for
damages. It was held that the agreement was uninforceable,
inasmuch as it tended to deprive stockholders of the free
exercise of their judgment, and was accordingly against public
policy.
Hafer v. New York, Lake Eie, & Western R. R. Company,
14 Wkly Law Bull. (Ohio) 68 (885), is the first important
case upon the subject. Therein an agreement had been made
between the Erie Railroad and holders of a majority of stock
in another railroad, by the terms of which agreement it was
provided that the stock should be registered in the name of
the President of the Erie Railroad, who should deliver to an
appointee of the directors of that company an irrevocable
proxy authorizing him to vote upon his stock. In considera-
tion therefor "pool certificates," so-called, were issued to the
stockholders, upon which were guaranteed an annual dividend.
A stockholder, not one of the majority who had thus surren-
dered their certificates, filed a petition praying that the President
of the Erie should be enjoined from delivering any proxy to
vote, or from voting on the stock registered in his name. It will
be apparent from the preliminary distinction taken above
respecting contracts unlawful in their ends, that the voting trust
in this case was a device for effecting an illegal purpose, and
consequently void. And so the court held. They added, how-
ever, considerations upon the voting trust itself. "The law,"
they said, "has confided the care of the franchises and prop-
erty of this company to the stockholders, and it is the duty
of each stockholder to vote for directors of the company with
an eye singly to its best interests.
"Here a large number of the stockholders, for a valuable
consideration, have attempted to confer their right to vote upon
the directors of another company. This transaction, apart from
the want of power in the N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. to enter into
it, is plainly illegal. It places in the hands of persons, in this
connection unknown to the law, the powers which have been
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-confided to the stockholders, to be exercised by them accord-
ing to their judgment, will, and discretion for the joint benefit
of all concerned. The law presumes that the pecuniary interest
of a stockholder will be a motive to impel him to vote in such
a manner as will promote the interests of the company. Such
a motive is entirely lacking in one who is not a stockholder,
and if such a person be empowered to vote for directors he may
be subject to interests and motives other than such as would
conduce to the welfare oflhe company." 19 Wkly Law Bull.,
at pp. 70-I. Upon this decision a new agreement was entered
into, by which a majority of the stock of the subsidiary railroad
was placed in the hands of three trustees for the period of five
years and as much longer a time as should elapse before it was
rescinded by a two-thirds vote of those beneficially interested.
"Assignable trust certificates," similar to those adopted in the
case of the Erie Railroad Company, were issued to the benefi-
cial holders, securing them all other rights except the right to
vote. Certain parties purchased a minority of such trust cer-
tificates and tendered them to the trustees, requesting the return
of the stock in the company represented by such certificates.
This request the trustees refused, and an application for an
injunction was made to prevent the trustees from voting on
such stock and to compel the transfer of such stock. Such an
injunction was granted extending only to the stock represented
by the trust certificates. The opinion of the court is interest-
ing. They say: "The agreement made may be finally reduced
to this: The entire beneficial interest of the stock is severally
vested in the certificate holders, the voting power in the trus-
tees; and the situation does not differ materially from what it
would be if the stockholders, retaining their shares, had simply
united in a proxy authorizing the trustees to cast the vote of all
of them for directors.
"We can perceive no reason why any number of share-
holders, either by means of proxy or by vesting the legal title
in another, may not authorize him to vote on their stock; and
as such is the substance of this agreement, we consider it not
illegal. So long as the parties to it, or their successors in
interest are satisfied with it, no other person may complain,
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and the 'irrevocable clause' does not effect the rights of any
one. But if the equitable owner elects to withdraw the legal
title from the holder thereof, the case assumes a different
aspect. If such demand be not complied with, the party
holding the entire beneficial interest in the stock cannot cast
the vote thereof, while it may be voted upon by one having no
interest in it or in the company; and so it may come to pass
that the ownership of the majority of the stock of a company
may be vested in one set of persons and the control of the
company irrevocably vested in others. It seems clear that
such a state of affairs would be intolerable, and is not contem-
plated by the law, the universal policy of which is that the
control of stock companies shall be and remain with the
owners of the stock. The right to vote is an incident of the
ownership of stock, and cannot exist apart from it. The
owners of these trust-certificates are, in our opinion, the equit-
able owners of the shares of stock which they represent, and
being such, the incidental right to vote upon the stock neces-
sarily pertains to them. They may permit the trustees, as
holders of the legal title, to vote in their stead, if they choose,
but when they elect to exercise the power themselves, the law
will not permit the trustees to refuse it to them:" Griffit/ v..
Jewett, 15 Wkly Law Bull. (Ohio) 419, 422, (I886). This
amounts to the position that a stockholder cannot irrevocably
divest himself by agreement or otherwise of the power to vote
on his stock, and that equity will enforce his revocation of such
an agreement. It further states as the opinion of the court,
that a combination of stockholders, under an agreement vest-
ing the right of voting in trustees, is not illegal in itself and
amounts only to the giving of revocable proxies. This opinion
is applied in the case of Zimmerman v. Jewett, 15 Wkly Law
Bull. (Ohio) 423 (1886), which was argued with the case of
Grffithz v. Jcwett, 15 Wkly Law Bull. (Ohio) 419 (i886).
Therein, the complainant was not a holder of the certificates
of beneficial interest but a stockholder who sought to prevent
any voting by the trustee upon the stock held by him. His
motion for an injunction was denied, and the case of Hafer v.
. 1., L. E. & IV. R. R. Co., stated to have gone upon the
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ground of the illegal, purpose of the voting trust created in that
case, where "a majority of the shareholders, for a pecuniary
benefit to themselves, transferred the right to vote upon their
shares to a party not otherwise interested in the road:" 15
Wkly Law Bull., at p. 423.
Wooduff v. Dubuque, &c., JR. R. Co., 30 Fed. R. 91 (i887),
is a decision to the same effect, although the facts were slightly
different. Therein, in order to carry into effect a plan to sell
or lease the railroad, the various stockholders deposited their
stock with Drexel, Morgan & Co. under an agreement
by which they transferred their stock with power to sell or
lease the railroad, securing to themselver by means of nego-
tiable receipts their interest in the stock. Complainants, who
had thus deposited their stock, filed a bill praying, first, the
return of their stock; and secondly, an injunction against
Drexel, Morgan & Co. restraining them from voting on
the remaining stock deposited with them. For the same
reasons as those which obtained in Griffith v.Jewett, I5 Wkly
Law Bull. 419 (1886), the first prayer was granted, while the
second was denied. Upon this second prayer the court said:
"The other depositors may prefer to have the directors vote or
control the vote upon their stock according to the arrangement.
If so, that appears to be their 'right:" 30 Fed. R., at p. 99.
Decisions to the effect that stockholders are entitled to with-
draw at their pleasure from a voting trust follow now in several
of the State Courts. In Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 6o8 (1887),
a clause was inserted in the agreement to the effect that no
right to vote should accrue to assignees upon the sale of stock
placed in a voting trust, and that the trustees should have the
right to purchase the stock in preference to any third parties.
It was held, however, on an application to enforce the privi-
lege of purchasing and to enjoin the sale of the stock and right
to vote thereon, that the petition must be dismissed. Again,
in Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. C. C. 193 (1889), which will be
considered more in detail below, the actual decision is to the
same effect. Similar orders, enforcing the right of stock-
holders to withdraw from the voting trust, whether they are
original parties to the agreement or assignees of such parties,
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were made in Starbuck v. Mercantile Trust Compa;y, 6o Conn.
553 (189o); in re Germicide Company, 65 Hun. (N. Y.) 6o6
,(1892); in White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Company, 52 N J.
Eq. 178 (1893), and in Harvey v. Linville Improvement Com-
,pany, Advance Sheets, N. C. (1896).
It is manifest that these decisions have not involved the
determination of the question of the validity of the voting
trust in itself. Its validity was attacked directly in the case of
Shelmerdine v. Welsh, 47 L. I. (Phila. C. P.) 26 (i89O), upon
the intimations contained in the opinion of which case, voting
trust agreements have, it appears, been largely modeled. In that
-case, under a former reorganization of the Reading Railroad, the
.securities, bonds and stock were vested in what is known as a
- Reconstruction Board," which had power to adjust priorities,
fix rates of interest, execute mortgages, give liens for such
mortgages, and issue new certificates of stock. Large dis-
-cretionary powers were given to this board by the depositing
bondholders and stockholders, and they were to act with the
.advice and consent of another body composed of several mem-
"bers, known as the "Voting Trust," in whom, upon the recon-
struction, the stock was to be vested. This had been done,
-and certificates of beneficial interest had been issued. On a
Saturday of one week a complainant stockholder moved for
.an injunction to stay or regulate an election which was to
occur on the following Monday, and for an order restraining
the voting upon the stock held by the Voting Trustees.
The court declined to grant a temporary injunction on the
ground that the interests involved were too complex and
-of too great magnitude to permit of interference upon
such short notice. The presiding judge, however, very
-clearly indicated his opinion upon the merits in the following
language: " In considering this question I may begin with a
proposition which no one is likely to dispute. Under the
,statutes of this State, and on general principles, the right to
-vote on stock cannot be separated from the ownership in such
sense that the elective franchise shall be in one man and the
entire beneficial interest in another; nor to any extent, unless
the circumstances take the case out of the general rule. It
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matters not that the end is beneficial and the motive good,.
because it is not always possible to ascertain objects and
motives, and if such a severance were permissible it might be
abused. The person who votes must, consequently, be an
owner, but it does not follow that he must be the only one-
If, for instance, stock is pledged as a collateral, whether the
debtor or creditor shall vote depends on the terms on which
the pledge is made. The power is, under these circumstances,
necessarily to some extent severed from the ownership, and
the parties may, consequently, determine on which side it shall
lie. So much is conceded on each side of this controversy,
and the question is, can the debtor and creditor agree to lodge
the vote in some one who is to act for both so long as the
debt remains and the stock is held as security for its payment?
"The counsel for the Reading Railroad contended that
such a course is not forbidden by any rule or principle. In
their opinion there is no reason that forbids a stockholder to
transfer his shares to bne man as a security for a debt due to
another, with a stipulation that the holder shall have the right
to vote, and the case would be the same although the inter-
mediary gave the debtor a certificate that the equitable owner--
"ship was in him subject to the payment of the amount due.
No authority directly in point has been cited on either side,
but we incline to think that this view is correct and rules the
case in hand. It has, indeed, been argued for the complain-
ants that the power conferred on the members of the voting
trust is not coupled with an interest; that they have a dry
legal title, with no active duties to perform, and that they
should be compelled to transfer the shares standing in their
names to the persons who are the beneficial owners.
"We think that this view errs in looking solely towards the
stockholders. They are not the only persons beneficially inter-
ested in the railroad; the lien creditors are also owners, and,
if harmony be not preserved, may possess the whole. It was
therefore necessary to have some arbiter to reconcile interests
which were jarring and might diverge, and the want was
supplied by the voting trust. To decide that the election must
be held exclusively on behalf of the holders of the stock certifi-
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cates would frustrate rather than give effect to the principle
that the votes should be cast by those who have a substantial
interest in the result. It is not easy to discern how the position
of the members of the trust differs from that of an individual
as a security for debt to a third person. The only duty of such
a holder is to keep the certificate safely until the debtor pays
or is in default, and then hand it over to whichever 'party is
equitably entitled. Had the duties of the Reconstruction
Board and Voting Trust been confided to a single body with
authority to secure the creditors by executing mortgages and
then hold the stock, with a right to vote in the way best cal-
culated to promote the common good, it could hardly have
been said that there were no active duties to uphold the trust
or that it came to an end when the mortgages were executed.
If this would have been the rule in the circumstances above
supposed, it does not, we think, vary the case that the end was
sought to be obtained through two closely related boards, one
supplementing and operating as a restraint on the other:" 47
L. I., at p. 26. The ground taken by the court rests wholly
upon the thought that the bondholders and other creditors
were entitled to protection, and that, since the stockholders'
rights were inferior to theirs, the voting trustees should be al-
lowed to represent the lien holders in voting upon the stock. It
is impossible not to perceive that there is a confusion here
between the rights of stockholders as individuals and the
corporation as an entity. The court regarded the stock-
holders as debtors and the mortgage bondholders as creditors.
But this is to regard the stockholders as constituting the cor-
poration, which is a confusion of thought. As above quoted,
the court says that, "it has been argued that the power
conferred upon the voting trust is not coupled with an interest
and that they ought to be compelled to transfer the shares
standing in their names to the persons who are the beneficial
owners. We think this view erred in looking solely toward
the stockholders, they are not the only persons beneficially
interested in the railroad, the lien creditors are also owners."
Certainly it is hard to see how the same parties can in their
capacity as lien holders be both owners and creditors. But in
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:any event the questi6n at issue was the right of voting upon
the stock, and whether the bondholders might properly be said
to own the railroad or not, certainly they could not be said to
.have an interest in its stock. The stock which was vested in the
Voting Trustees was solely owned by the stockholders, and the
lien creditors had no interest in that stock. Consequently the
Voting Trustees were trustees, so far as the stock was con-
cerned, for the stockholders only. The position taken by the
court in this matter is therefore open to grave objection,
resting, as it does, upon a confusion of the stockholders as
individuals with the debtor corporation. It amounts to hold-
ing that because a bondholder has an interest in a railroad
he has an interest in its stock.
Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. C. C. i93 (1889), is an especially
.interesting decision. In this case a voting trust had been
,created by which a large majority of the stock of a railroad
corporation was vested in five trustees jointly. A special book
was kept and certificates of beneficial interest were issued
-representing an equivalent amount of the stock "standing in
•the names of the trustees in whom is vested the perpetual
power to vote same." Complainant demanded the delivery to
.himself of the stock of the railroad for which he held such
.beneficial certificates, and filed a bill to enforce his demand.
The court, in disposing of the matter, said: "We think that
.the trust agreement in question is absolutely void as contrary
.to public policy, and because it substantially amounts to a
'repeal of our Act of Assembly in regard to the right to vote
incident to the'ownership of railroad stock. But whether this
be so or not, which, as the case stands, is not judicially before
us for our determination, we are of the opinion that it is at
least revocable by the plaintiff." It will be observed that this
.case takes a strong ground upon which to rest its decision.
The considerations in favor of such decision are, as has been
pointed out, that the theory of the corporation implies a duty
on the part of each stockholder to cast his vote for the benefit
of the corporation, that reliance upon the performance of such
duty must be upon the personal interest of such stockholder
springing from .his ownership of the stock, and that the voting
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trust is an attempt to bargain away the' right and duty of the-
stockholder to share in the control of the corporation without
consulting the welfare of the remaining stockholders. Such a
view is supported in the opinion of the court in Cone v. Russell,.
48 N. J. Eq. 2o8 (i891). In this case the complainants
held stock, as executors and trustees, in a certain transportation,
company. This stock, together with the defendant's holdings,.
constituted a majority. Complainants and defendant there-
upon entered into a contract by which the former gave
an irrevocable proxy for five years to the defendant to
vote on their stock, and the defendant agreed to employ
one of complainants at a certain salary. It was held that such
an agreement constituted a breach of trust on the complainants"
part, that the contract entered into had for its purpose an
illegal end, and that the prayer of complainants for an order
restraining the defendants from voting upon their stock must
be granted. But while so holding, the chancellor also ex-
pressly based his decision upon the invalidity of a voting trust
in itself. He said: -Where the majority of the stock is owned
by one man or set of them, acting in concert, the minority are,
to some extent, protected by the natural interest of the
majority to promote the real interest of the corporation. But
where a person who has little or no actual ownership, has the
unrestricted voting power of a majority ofthe stock, the minority
loses this protection, and what may be properly termed the-
underlying and fundamental understanding and contract upon
which the association is founded is abandoned and broken: "
48 N. J. Eq., at p. 214. Thus, although the voting trust was
vitiated by the purposes for which it was called into being, the
court distinctly based its decision upon the invalidity of the
voting trust. Again, Starbuck v. Mercantile Trust Co., 6o
Conn. 553 (189o), was likewise a case in which the purposes
leading to the creation of the voting trust were tainted with
illegality. Upon the application of assignees of trust certifi-
cates the court directed the transfer to them of the stock and
granted an injunction against the trustees voting on any stock
which stood in their names. The opinion of the court is very
elaborate, and they base their decision upon the broad ground
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of the illegality in se of the voting trust where trustees do not
represent a beneficial interest in the stock. In the opinion the
-court say: "It is the policy of our law that an untrammelled
power to vote shall be incident to the ownership of the stock,
•and a contract by which the original owner's power is hampered
by a provision therein, that he shall vote just as somebody
else dictates, is objectionable. I think it against the policy of
the law of this State for a stockholder to contract that his
stock shall be voted as some one who has no beneficial
interest, or title in or to the stock directs, saving to himself
simply the title, the right to dividends, and perhaps the right
to cast the vote directed, willing or unwilling, whether it be
for his interest, for the interest of other stockholders, of the
interest of the corporation or otherwise. This I conceive to
be against the policy of the law, whether the power so to vote
be for five years or for all time. It is the policy of the law of
our State, that ownership of stock shall control the property
and the management of the corporation, and this cannot be
accomplished, and this good policy is defeated if stockholders
are permitted to surrender all their discretion and will, in the
important matter of voting, and suffer themselves to be mere
passive instruments in the hands of some agent who has no
interest in the stock, equitable or legal, and no interest in the
general prosperity of the corporation.
"And this is not entirely for the protection of the stock-
holder himself, but to compel a compliance with the duty
which eacl stockholder owes his fellow-stockholder-to use
such power and means as the law and his ownership of stock
gave him, so that the general interest of stockholders is pro-
tected, and the general welfare of the corporation is sustained,
and the business conducted by its agents, managers and
officers, so far as may be, upon prudent and honest business
principles, and with just as little temptation to and opportunity
for fraud and the seeking of individual gains, at the sacrifice
-of the general welfare, as is possible. This, I take it, is the
duty that one stockholder in a corporation owes to his fellow-
stockholder, and he cannot be allowed to disburden himself of
it in this way. He may shirk it, perhaps, by refusing to
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attend stockholders' meetings, or by declining to vote whew
called upon, but the law will not allow him to strip himself of'
the power to perform his duty. To this extent, at least, a
stockholder stands in a fiduciary relation to his fellow-stock-
holders. For these reasons I hold that this trust agreement
is void as against the policy of the law of this State :" 6o Conn.,
at pp. 579, 580.
Railway Co. v. State, 49 0. S. 669 (1892), is an interesting
case which reached the Ohio court of last resort. It arose
upon a quo warranto to determine what directors were author-
ized to act for the company. Certain stock had been deposited
by various stockholders with Brown, Shipley & Co. for the
purpose of arranging differences between preferred and com-
mon stockholders respecting cumulative preferred dividends,
and in order to aid in the readjustment of the affairs of the
company generally. The agreement of deposit provided that
Brown, Shipley & Co. should vote the stock according to the
instructions of a stockholders' committee, and should issue
beneficial certificates. Directors were elected by votes cast
upon this stock, the validity of whose ,election was intended
to be raised by the quo warranto. The court held the election..
legal upon the grounds stated in the following extract from
their opinion: " It does not appear that the ownership of the.
stock and its voting power were separated by the agreement
under which the shareholders' committee was appointed and the
stock deposited with the depositary therein, Brown, Shipley &
Co., and that agreement does not, therefore, constitute what is
known as a voting trust. It was at most a convenient method
by which distant and widely separated shareholders became
enabled directly to participate in the *control and manage-
ment of the company, and from which each could recede at any
time and demand the return of his stock without violating
any term of the agreement. The depositary is a proxy
required to vote the stock as directed by the committee, and
he and the committee both derived their power from the-
shareholders by the same instrument, and, in the end, effec-
tuate their wishes. Such an agreement differs widely from an
agreement whereby the stock is placed in the hands of trustees.
R
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who are invested with the power of voting it as their interests
may dictate, irrespective of the wishes or directioii of the
owners. Such an agreement as the latter would be void as
against the policy of our corporation law:" 49 0. S., at p. 68o.
The last case to be considered, and one of considerable
importance, is that of Mobile and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Nicholas,
12 S. R. 723 (1893). Therein the railroad was in the hands
of a receiver and its indebtednesss was very great. There
were several decrees of foreclosure existing and their execution
would have absorbed all the equities of the stockholders.
Under these circumstances an agreement was made between
the creditors and the stockholders by which the right to vote
the stock was vested in trustees, and the creditors' claims
vested in the same trustees. A sinking fund was created and
debentures were issued to the creditors by the trustees, while
the stockholders agreed that the trustees should hold the
stock and vote thereon until the payment of the debentures.
Certificates were issued to the stockholders that they were
entitled to so many shares together with all rights, privileges,
dividends and profits, except that such certificates were subject
to the power given to the trustees to vote irrevocably upon the
said shares until the payment of the said debentures. Certain
of the stockholders brought a bill in equity to enforce this
right to vote upon their stock, relying upon two grounds:
first, that the charter providing that a vote should be given to
each stockholder was contravened by the agreement ; second,
that the agreement was against public policy. The court
answered the first claim by saying that the charter also
provided that the vote might be cast by a lawful proxy. But
it will be observed that a proxy is universally considered
revocable and that the agreement in the present case contem-
plated an irrevocable power to vote as being vested in the
trustees. The court considered the second point relative to
the validity of the voting trust at considerable length, and came
to the conclusion that all the cases in which the voting trust
was considered illegal went upon the ground of the unlawful
purpose for which it was created and not upon the ground of
intrinsic illegality. They say: " We have examined case after
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case, and find generally that the agreements declared void by
the courts, where the power to vote was separated from the
stockholders and vested in third persons, were under circum-
stances which showed that the purpose to be accomplished
was unlawful,--such as the courts would not sanction if the
principal had voted, and not a proxy, and, in case of a mere
dry trust, it is held that the stockholder might revoke a power
of attorney in form irrevocable:" 12 S. R., at p. 731.
The court then proceeded to consider the matter upon
principle. Quotation is made from Mr. Morawetz's work on
Corporation Law and sentences are taken out of their context,
in order to serve as authority against maintaining a distinction
between stockholders as individuals and the corporation as an
entity. "We approve," it is said, " of his definition of a ' cor-
poration,' that 'it is but a collective name for the corporators
or members who compose an incorporated association; ' it 'is
really an association of persons:'" 12 S. R., at p. 734.
Applying these views to the case of a stockholder, the court
continued: "As a' member of the corporated association,' the
debt of the corporation is his debt, so far as he is a stock-
holder:" 12 S. R., at p. 735. "As a stockholder, he may
surrender his voting power, upon proper consideration, and
for a proper purpose, to secure the debt of the corporation,
which, as a member of the corporate association, is his debt :"
12 S. R., at p. 735. Following this reasoning, the bill of com-
plainant was dismissed and his right to vote upon stock
standing in the name of the trustees denied. It will be
observed that this case furnishes the only instance of the refusal
of such an application. It is based, like the decision in
Shelmerdine v. Welsh, 47 L. I. 26 (i89o), upon a confusion
between the stockholders as individuals with the corporation.
At the same time, the facts were such as to appeal to the
general sense of justice in the court. The road was only saved
from foreclosure and the stockholders from total loss by an
agreement whereby the stock and voting power were vested
in trustees, whose primary duty it was to protect the creditors
of the corporation. The answer to one urging these facts
would of course be that no consideration is superior to the
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preservation of the integrity of legal principles, but the facts
had undoubtedly great weight with the court.
We turn now to sum up, so far as we are able, the results
of the decisions we have considered. The objects sought to
be obtained in the several cases have been two: first, the
enforcement of the right of a stockholder to withdraw from a
voting trust agreement; second, the restraining of voting
trustees from casting any votes by virtue of a voting trust
agreement. In Railway Co. v. State, 49 0. S. 669 (1892), it
is true that the case arose upon a quo warranto, but the agree-
ment was there held not to constitute a voting trust.
Upon the first point the cases have, with the single excep-
tion of that of 17fobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Nicholas, 12 S. R.
723 (1893), been unanimous to the effect that at his pleasure
the beneficial owner of stock may withdraw from a voting
trust, demand the transfer to himself of his stock, and vote
upon the same. This right is independent of any clause of
irrevocability, and extends to the assignee of an original party
to the agreement. It should be observed, however, that in
none of these cases had there been a reorganization to carry out
which a voting trust was created, and in none of them did there
exist considerations which would tend to raise a feeling on the
part of the court in favor of the trust; in fact, in most of the
cases such considerations made the other way. In M1fobile & I
Ohio R. R. Co. v. Nidholas, 12 S. R. 723 (1893), where there
was such a reorganization and such considerations existed, the
decision was adverse to the stockholders. Likewise it was
adverse in Shelmerdine v. Welsh, 47 L. I. 26 (I89O), upon
similar facts, although the prayer in that case sought to pre-
vent the Voting Trustees from voting upon any of the stock
registered in their names.
Several of the cases which w& have just been studying as
contributing to the determination of the law upon the question
just considered have contained discussions upon the second
question as to the illegality in se of a voting trust, and the
consequent right of a stockholder to obtain an injunction
restraining the voting of all the stock vested in voting trustees.
Thus, the dicta in Grifth v. Jcwett, 15 Wkly Law Bull. 419
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(1886), and in Woodruff v. Dubuque, &c., R. R. Co., -30 Fed.
R. 91 (887), are to the effect that a voting trust is not illegal
in itself, and that no injunction should' be granted against
Voting Trustees to restrain them from voting the stock vested
in them by willing and assenting stockholders. Zimmerman v.
Jewett, 15 Wkly Law Bull. 423 (1886); Brown v. Pacfic Mail
Stearn~~ p Co., 5 Blatchf. 525 (I865); Sielmerdine v. Welsh,
47 L. I. 26 (189o); and Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Nicholas,
12 S. R. 723 (893), are, moreover, direct decisions to the
same effect. There are, however, three cases in opposition:
Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. C. C. 193 (1889); Cone v. Russell,
48 N.J. Eq. 2o8 (1891); and Starbuckv.Mercantile Trust Co.,
6o Conn. 553 (189o). The basis upon which the decision in
each is rested is distinctly the intrinsic illegality of a voting
trust. The effect of these decisions is, however, weakened by
the fact that, in Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. C. C. 193 (1889),
it has only the force of a dictum, while in Cone v. Russell, 48
N. J. Eq. 208 (1891), and in Starbuck v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
6o Conn. 553 (189o), the voting trust was created to further
illegal purposes.
We have now reached the point where we must consider, in
the light of the authorities thus gathered together, the validity
of the voting trust provisions in recent railroad reorganizations
as they have been stated in the case of the Erie Railroad.
Recalling the way in which the cases have arisen, the first
question that is presented to one's mind respects the right of
holders of beneficial trust certificates, as issued by Erie, to
demand the transfer to themselves of Erie stock and to vote
upon the same. We have seen that the strong tendency of
the decisions, and the attitude of the various courts, was in the
direction of enforcing such rights upon the facts presented in
the reported cases. In the form of voting trust under con-
sideration, however, there are decided differences, whether
material or not is a matter for consideration. As has been in
detail set forth, the Erie stQck was issued to a committee as
consideration for the property of the older foreclosed railroad,
and wag then transferred to three Voting Trustees under an
agreement by which these trustees agreed to hold and vote
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upon the stock, and to secure the rights of beneficial owners
by the issuance of stock trust certificates. In all the reported
cases the stock was once held by the stockholders, and a
portion of it was afterwards vested by such stockholders in
Voting Trustees. Under such circumstances the right to
rescind the agreement, whether in terms irrevocable or not,
was enforced. But inasmuch as all the stock was vested first
in the committee representing the stockholders, who acted
according to the express direction of the stockholders in
transferring to the Voting Trustees, this difference is seen to be
only apparent. The fact that in the agreement under discus-
sion all the stock, and not a portion only, was vested in the
trustees would not seem under the decisions to prejudice the
rights of a stockholder to withdraw, which will be clear from
an examination of the reasoning in the cases as exemplified in
the quotation above given from Griftithl v. Jewett, 15 Wkly
Law Bull. 419 (1886). The most important consideration,
however, is whether the voting trust under discussion comes
within the reasoning which appealed to the court in Shel-
nerdine v. W1elsh, 47 L. I. 26 (I89O), and Mobile & Ohio
R. R. Co. v. Nichtolas, 12 S. R. 723 (1893). Undoubtedly in
these cases and in the voting trusts under discussion, the trust
was adopted in order to facilitate reorganization of bankrupt
railroads by placing and securing the voting power in the
hands of parties friendly to the lien creditors. The reasoning
which sustained the decision in the two cases named was that
the stockholders were virtually debtors and that, to save their
equities, it was proper for them to agree to vest the voting
power in parties representative of the creditors. But in the
railroad reorganizations like that of Erie under discussion, we
are dealing with a new corporation, and it is a necessary pre-
sumption under the various State statutes and the common
law that the stock issued for property is worth its face value.
The new railroad must be presumed solvent, otherwise under
the so-called " trust-fund doctrine" the stockholders must be
considered liable to the extent of the par value of the stock
less the actual value of the property exchanged therefor. If,
then, the stock of these railroads is to be considered as given
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for property worth the par value of the stock, it follows that
the facts are not such as to bring the voting trusts of these
reorganizations under discussion, within the reasoning of the
two cases named. The conclusion, therefore, upon the
authority of decided cases is inevitable: that the holders of
beneficial trust certificates issued according to the recent rail-
road reorganization plans have a right to demand at their
pleasure the transfer to them of the stock represented by such
trust certificates and that the courts will enforce such demand
and protect their right to vote upon such stock.
Upon the second question: whether upon application of a
stockholder a court would enjoin trustees, holding stock as
those do in the case of the Erie Railroad, from voting upon
such stock, on the ground of the intrinsic illegality of the trust
agreement, we have seen that the reported cases are not in
accord. And it would be idle to attempt to formulate definite
conclusions respecting the weight of authority upon this
subject. The considerations drawn from the cases which would
be likely to enter into the decision of a court upon such an
application should be stated. To begin with, there is no taint
of illegality in the motives leading to the creation of voting
trust agreements like those under discussion; rather, so far
as the business interests to be subserved are concerned, the.
motives would seem meritorious. On the other hand, the
theory which underlay the decisions maintaining the intrinsic
illegality of voting trust agreements, was that they were efforts,
to disregard the confidence implied in the franchise of a cor-
poration and to separate ownership from the voting power and
control, and that such efforts tended to produce irresponsibility-
in the management of corporations. Now, in the Erie voting
trust agreement, the clearest ground is laid for such objec-
tions. There was an agreement, when the application for a
charter was made, that the stock should be vested in parties as
Voting Trustees, who needed neither to have nor to reresent
any other interest in the stock or in the railroad, and whose
powers might extend indefinitely. The control so secured was
wholly without reference to the interest of the Voting Trustees;
and, to emphasize their irresponsibility, the following pro--
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visions already quoted, were inserted in the agreement:
"Seventh. In voting the stock held by them, the Voting
Trustees will exercise their best judgment from time to time to
select directors, to the end that the affairs of the company
shall be properly managed, and, in voting on other matters
which may come before them at any stockholder's meeting,
will exercise like judgment; but they assume no responsibility
in respect to such management or in respect of any action
taken pursuant to their votes so cast, it being understood that
no Voting Trustee incurs any responsibility by reason of any
error of law or of any matter or thing done or omitted under
this agreement, except for his own individual malfeasance."
To sustain such an agreement is to sustain the validity of the
voting trust in its strongest form.
It only remains for us to add a few comments upon the
possible development of the law upon the present subject.
We have endeavored to trace the tendencies in the reported
cases ; and in them it will have been observed that anything
like a definite formulation of conclusions is impossible, that
the cases have been largely nisiprius decisions and reflect con-
flicting tendencies. It may, however, be stated with certainty
that the effect of the cases is to throw doubt on the ability of
counsel for voting trustees to maintain in full effect against
legal opposition a voting trust agreement such as that existing
in the case of the Erie Railroad. But, while bearing this in mind,
there must not be forgotten the great influence in the direction
of conservatism, which the financial interests involved impress
upon the mind of a judge, tending to make him chary of
interference. A judge must inevitably hesitate before he
asserts the invalidity of one of the most important provisions
in the reorganization of the Erie System, the Northern Pacific
System, the Union Pacific System, the Philadelphia and Read-
ing Railroad Co. and the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad
Co. But while thus hesitating and rightly hesitating, he should
not allow himself to forget that finally, and in the larger sweep of
time, the consequences to flow from the adoption of considera-
tions of expediency must be confusing and disastrous, the conse-
quences to flow from the adoption of true principles, salutary.
Charles H. Burr, jr.
